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DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS BY RELIGION 
AND EDUCATION IN INDIA1 
INTRODUCTION
In the past years demographic methods have been applied to global and national 
estimates and projections of religion, both globally and for individual nations across 
the world (PEW 2011, Kaufmann et al. 2012, Goujon et al. 2007, Stonawski et al. 
2014, 2015). By factoring in religion-specific fertility differentials and changes in age 
structure, one can more accurately forecast changes in the country’s religious composi-
tion than is possible through a simple extrapolation. However, members of religious 
groups tend to differ in numerous other socio-economic characteristics and observed 
fertility differentials may be influenced for example more by variation in education 
than a result of belonging to a particular religious group. Education has been consist-
ently found to influence fertility (Bongaarts 2003, Jejeebhoy 1995, Fuchs and Goujon 
2014) as well as both child and adult mortality (Kravdal 2004, Albouy and Lequien 
1 We would like to thank Markus Speringer for creating the maps and Matthew Cantele for the 
editing. We acknowledge support by a Starting Grant of the European Research Council, Grant Agre-
ement 241003-COHORT. 
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2009, Subramanian et al. 2006). The relation between education and fertility is nega-
tive, and stronger than for other measures of socio-economic development, including 
income or occupational status (Skirbekk 2008). In this paper we argue that incorpo-
rating education as an additional dimension of the multi-state projection model can 
further improve projections of country’s future religious composition. 
We illustrate the relevance of education for projecting changes of religious land-
scape in the case of India. This religiously diverse country may become the most 
populous nation on earth in the coming 15 years (UN 2013), but its longer term 
demographic development remains highly uncertain. On the one hand, it has expe-
rienced rapid economic growth, high levels of urbanization, increases in literacy and 
strong fertility decline. On the other hand, in spite of rapid societal change a large 
share of India’s population remains rural and conservative regarding cultural norms 
and customs, with levels of formal schooling increasing relatively slowly compared 
to other middle income countries (Dyson et al. 2005, Nachane 2011). Religion is 
central in the identity and daily lives of many Indians – only 0.1% of the Indian 
population in the 2001 census did not state a religion. This is highly relevant in the 
context of India as religion is an important determinant of demographic behaviour 
for many (Joseph 2013, Kumar 2012).
India is also a country of great social inequality and regional disparities. Gaps 
in education and differences in family size are significant across the subcontinent’s 
plentiful religious groups. Hindus are by far the most numerous and amount to 80% of 
India’s population in 2001. However, Muslims and some other smaller religious have 
higher fertility than Hindus. One can expect that India’s religious composition will be 
changing due to the distinctly different demographic behaviour of various religions. 
Will India become a more religiously diverse country by mid-21st century? In this 
paper we focus on this question. We look at the possible future religious compositions 
of India’s population depending on demographic and educational change. We inves-
tigate several alternative scenarios of future change in India’s religious composition 
derived from the significant educational differentials we find in the country. 
In the next section we elaborate on the relevance of including an educational 
dimension for modelling religious change and explain the multistate model we apply 
to model demographic, educational and religious change simultaneously. Before 
moving to the projection results, we look at religious and educational disparities 
across Indian states. We conclude with presenting projections of the religious com-
position in India by education until 2050.
RELIGIOSITY, EDUCATION AND FERTILITY
For as long as it has been measured, education has been found to generally be 
negatively associated with fertility (in contrast to other indicators such as income) 
(Akmam 2002, Abou-Gamrah 1982, Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2009, Skirbekk 2008). 
Demographic projections by religion and education in India
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Today, education is one of the most important drivers of differential fertility – longer 
education tends to imply later marriage, later onset of childbearing, and a smaller 
family size – with stronger effects in poorer countries. Further, religious differentials 
in developing countries have been explained to a large extent by variation in educa-
tion levels (Heaton 2011). 
Contraceptive use differs by religious groups, and it has for a long period (Bhat 
and Zavier 2005). Among married women, Hindus saw their current use of contra-
ception remain lower, for example contraceptive use rose from 14% to 49% in the 
years 1970 –1999, while for Muslims it increased from 9% to 37% over the same 
period. Differences in education and other socioeconomic traits can explain much 
of the differences observed in contraception and fertility between religious groups 
(Joseph 2013, Rocca et al. 2013). Yet, religion can have independent effects on 
fertility (Rocca et al. 2013).
Education can also explain differences in demographic behaviour by religious 
groups. Indian education levels differ significantly between religious groups (Jeffery 
and Jeffery 1997). In Dhanbad district, Jharkhand, data collected through a house-
hold survey suggest that the number of children is greater among Muslims than 
Hindus, but at a higher educational status the difference narrows considerably. Thus, 
education seems to have a fertility-converging effect, reducing the fertility differ-
ences between Hindus and Muslims (Siddiqui and Jamal 2012).
Education has also been found to affect religiosity. In Turkey, compulsory school 
reforms implemented in 1998 – individuals born after a specific date had to go to 
school for 8 years while those born earlier could drop out after 5 – led to lowered religi-
osity in terms of wearing a headscarf, attending Qur’anic courses and regular praying 
(Gulesci and Meyersson 2012). The marginal effect of an extra year of schooling in 
Canada has been found to relate to a 4 percent drop in religiosity (Hungerman 2011). 
Education and religion are both important individual and societal characteristics. Fur-
ther, they may also be important for determining fertility levels and group-specific as 
well as overall population growth. India is home to numerous religious traditions. Hin-
duism and Buddhism, two of the largest world religions were born in India as well as 
many other religions that find their roots there (including Jainism and Sikhism). India 
has the largest community of Hindus and the third largest community of Muslims glo-
bally (PEW 2012). In 20012, there were 81.7% of Hindus, 11.6% of Muslims, 2.9% of 
Christians, and 3.9% of others among the Indian population at age 25 and older3.
2 Population composition by religion and/or education from the 2011 census was not available 
by 2015.
3 We choose to focus on individuals aged 25 and above. This is done for the following reasons: 
a) most religious (and other types of attitudinal or value-orientation related change) takes place at 
younger ages, typically around the teens or early twenties (Skirbekk et al. 2010, Ryder 1980, Goujon et 
al. 2007); b) by avoiding focusing on children and early adults we also avoid controversies surrounding 
whether children should automatically be assigned the religion of their parents or one should wait until 
early adulthood. c) as we are focused on education, we would like to present data for an age where most 
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In spite of increases in literacy and education, the Indian population is still lag-
ging behind China and the “tiger economies” of South-East Asia. Mean years of 
schooling (MYS) among population at age 25 and above equalled 7.9 years in 2001. 
Christians are the best-educated religious group with 12.2% of people with post-sec-
ondary education and 35.2% with secondary education (Table 1). Thus, their share 
of the total post-secondary educated population is disproportionately larger than their 
representation within the general population. The proportion of Christians among 
post-secondary educated was 4.8% in 2001 but if the shares had corresponded to the 
proportional distribution of the religious groups, the Christian share would have been 
3.9%. Among people with no education a mere 1.6% were Christians (Figure 1). 
The lowest educated group is Muslims; only 3.8% had post-secondary education 
and 17.3% attained secondary level. Muslims (11.6% of the total population) were 
overrepresented among those with no formal education (13.1%) and among those 
with primary education (12.7%). Among Hindus 7.4% were post-secondary educated 
and 22.6% secondary educated. School enrolment rates suggest that religion-specific 
differences are likely to persist in the future. In 2005 the General Enrolment Rate 
(GER) in higher Indian education was 16.7% for Christians, 11.9% for Hindus and 
a mere 6.8% for Muslims (University Grants Commission 2008). Gender gaps in 
education are strongly pronounced as well, in particular among Muslims and Hindus. 
Figure 1. Religious composition of population 25 and older by education in India in 2001, in %
Source: own calculations based on Indian census 2001.
have completed their education – we therefore choose the age of 25 as many still are in their education 
in their early twenties. 
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In a country the size of India one can expect significant regional variation in 
socio-cultural characteristics. This turns out to be true for both religion and educa-
tion. Educational differences arise due to different state policies. We can expect 
higher educational attainments in the southern compared to the less developed north-
ern states (Suryanarayana et al. 2011).
Hindus are a clear majority in most large Indian states while north-eastern, north-
ern states and Kerala are religiously diverse (Figure 2). In five states we find more 
than 90% of Hindus (Himachal Pradesh [HP: 95.4%], Chhattisgarh [CT: 94.7%], 
Orissa [OR: 94.4%], Dadra and Nagar Haveli [DN: 93.5%] and Madhya Pradesh 
[MP: 91.1%]). The states and union territories with the lowest shares are Nagaland 
(NL: 7.7%), Lakshadweep (LD: 3.7%) and Mizoram (MZ: 3.6%). As expected, we 
find the highest share of uneducated Hindus in Bihar (BR: 63.5%) and a very low 
share of adult population with at least lower secondary education in other northern 
states (Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh). Unsurprisingly, the states with 
the best-educated Hindu population (with less than 25% uneducated among 25 year 
and more olds and more than 7% with post-secondary education) are Delhi (DL: 
Figure 2.  Proportion and educational composition of Hindu population (aged 25 and more) by 
region in India in 2001*
* State abbreviations are described in Appendix 2.
Source: own calculations based on Indian Census 2001, cartography prepared by Markus Speringer.
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29.6% / 13.7%), Goa (GA: 28.1% / 8.4%) and Kerala (KL: 20.5% / 7.0%). Further 
more, Kerala has the lowest share of non-educated Hindus in India. The states with 
less than 3% of population with post-secondary education are Sikkim (SK: 3.0%), 
Bihar (BR: 2.8%), Chhattisgarh (2.7%) and Rajasthan (RJ: 2.6%). 
By contrast, India’s Christians are on average much better educated and a higher 
share of them than of any other religious group had post-secondary education. 
Christians in India were mainly located in the Northeastern states (here labelled as 
“Aggregate B”) and in the South, with the highest shares in Nagaland (NL: 90.0%), 
Mizoram (MZ: 87.0%), Meghalaya (ML: 70.3%) and Manipur (MN: 43.2%) (Fig-
ure 3). 24 out of 35 states and union territories had less than 5% Christian popula-
tion. In 13 spatial units located in Central, Western and Northern India the share 
was even less than 1%. Although marginal in numbers, more than 15% Christians 
residing in Delhi, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh, Haryana and Haryana attained 
post-secondary education  (DL: 24.1%, MP: 16.8%, HR: 15.6%) and more than 
50% had at least secondary education. The case of Madhya Pradesh shows that 
minority religious groups can be surprisingly successful in terms of human capital
Figure 3.  Proportion and educational composition of Christian population (aged 25 and more) by 
region* in India in 2001
* State abbreviations are described in Appendix 2.
Source: own calculations based on Indian Census 2001, cartography prepared by Markus Speringer.
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accumulation even in contexts where members of majority religions perform poorly. 
However, in Northeastern states where Christians form a higher share of population 
than elsewhere (the B cluster in the map), they are less educated than their counter-
parts in other Indian states but also less educated than Hindus resident in the same 
states.
Muslims, India’s largest religious minority group, are located nearly across the 
whole country. Their proportion is especially high in the Northern and Southwestern 
states, with the highest shares in Lakshadweep (LD: 95.5%), Jammu and Kashmir 
(JK: 67.0%), Assam (AS: 30.9%), West Bengal (WB: 25.2%) and Uttar Pradesh 
(UP: 24.7%) (Figure 4). In general, Muslims have relatively low education and in 
5 states the share of uneducated exceeds 60% of the population aged 25 and more 
(Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Uttaranchal). In Kerala, where 
educational attainment is higher than in most other states, nearly 40% of Muslims 
had at least secondary education – a similar share to Kerala’s Hindus. In spite of 
generally worse educational characteristics, Muslims are better educated than Hindus 
in 5 states: Arunachal Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Gujarat. In
Figure 4.  Proportion and educational composition of Muslim population (aged 25 and more) by 
region* in India in 2001
* State abbreviations are described in Appendix 2.
Source: own calculations based on Indian Census 2001, cartography prepared by Markus Speringer.
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all these states fewer Muslims than Hindus have no formal education and the share 
of those with primary education is higher. Except for Gujarat, the share or those 
with secondary education is about equal to Hindus and the share of post-secondary 
educated is generally lower. In Gujarat the educational advantage of Muslims in 
primary education is not translated into advantage at secondary level.
The share of confessors of other religions is the highest in the Northeastern states 
Arunachal Pradesh (AR: 31.6%), Jharkhand (JH: 13.1%), Meghalaya (ML: 11.8%) 
and Manipur (MN: 10.9%) (Figure 5). The share of other religious groups is high 
in states with a large Buddhist population while in the north-east and east indig-
enous groups with local folk religions comprise a large part of the residual group. 
The spatially small Daman and Diu (DD: 24.0%), Delhi (DL: 23.7%), Chandigarh 
(CH: 15.6%) and Pondicherry (PY: 15.5%) have the highest share of post-secondary 
educated population in the category of other religions. The states with lowest share 
of the highest educational category tend to be located in Central India, like Mad-
hya Pradesh (MP: 0.7%), Chhattisgarh (CT: 0.8%), West Bengal (WB: 0.9%) and 
Jharkhand (JH: 1.0%).
Figure 5.  Proportion and educational composition of confessors of other religions (aged 25 and 
more) in India by region* in 2001
 
*  State abbreviations are described in Appendix 2.
Source: own calculations based on Indian Census 2001, cartography prepared by Markus Speringer.
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PROJECTIONS BY RELIGION AND EDUCATION 
DATA AND METHODS
In this study, we carry out multi-state population projections by religion and 
education in India for the period 2000–2050. Multistate projection is a demographic 
methodology which can be used in projections of populations disaggregated by 
status – individual characteristics that can change over time – such as educational 
attainment, marital status, or religion and level of religiosity (for more details on this 
method see Philipov and Rodgers 1981, Hackett et al. 2014, Rogers 1975, 1995). 
First, we estimate the base population for the year 2000 by age, sex, religion, 
and education using the 2001 Indian census. We distinguish four religious groups: 
Christians, Muslims, Hindus and Others, and four educational groups: No education, 
Primary, Secondary and Post-secondary (Table 2). 
Table 2. Recoding of educational attainment categories
Category Abbreviation ISCED 1997 level
No education E1 0
Primary E2 1
Secondary E3 2 and 3
Post-secondary E4 4, 5 and 6
Differentials in childbearing levels and patterns by religion and education are then 
calculated using data from the 2005–2006 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). 
Then we estimate international migration flows by age, sex, religion and education. 
We include mechanism of intergenerational transmission of religion between moth-
ers and children that allows cohort effects to be included in the projection model. 
We also take into consideration trajectories of educational change during individual 
life span which are religion-specific. We do not include religious switching into the 
projection model because of empirical evidence suggest that changes of religious 
affiliation are very marginal in India.
PROJECTION ASSUMPTIONS AND SCENARIOS
Our aim is to study possible consequences of change in education and fertility 
on the future religious composition of India. We present four scenarios that illus-
trate the effect of education improvement, changing fertility differentials and stall 
in education and/or fertility.
13
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As we have argued in the previous sections, female education is a crucial determi-
nant of fertility outcomes. However, the proportion of females with at least second-
ary education in India was only around 20%. According to the UN, the TFR for India 
was 2.5 2010, but fertility is much lower for better-educated females. According to 
DHS 2005–2006, the TFR of women with no formal education was nearly twice 
the rate (3.55) of those who had at least 12 years of schooling (completed upper 
secondary education and higher, TFR 1.80).
Fertility differentials by religion and education are pronounced. TFRs by religion 
and education for the baseline period for India are shown in Figure 6. Baseline fertility 
rates were estimated by applying the differentials by education and religion to TFR 
for the 2000 UN estimates. We find the expected education gradient for all religious 
groups – women with no formal education have the highest fertility while highly edu-
cated the lowest. Differentials are the most pronounced for Muslims, who have the 
highest overall fertility (3.4 children), and the least pronounced for Christians, who 
have a lower overall TFR (2.3 children). Fertility rates of women with a minimum of 
secondary education are well below the country average for both Muslims and Hindus. 
Other religions are a mixed group that includes religious groups with sub-replacement 
fertility (Buddhists and Sikhs) as well as high-fertility groups of Folk-religionists and 
Jains. Fertility differentials are greatest among the less educated. 
Figure 6. Total fertility rate by religion and education* in India in 2000–2005
* E1 – no education, E2 – Primary education (some primary or completed primary), E3 – Secondary 
education (completed lower or higher secondary), E4 – Postsecondary (above upper secondary).
Source: own calculations based on DHS 2005-6 and UN 2011.
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We consider three possible trajectories of future fertility defined with respect 
to both absolute and relative fertility differentials across the religious and educa-
tional groups. Constant fertility (Fc) represents the simplest scenario where TFR 
is “frozen” as of 2000. This means that both the relative differentials and educa-
tion- and-religion-specific TFRs stay the same for the whole projection period. 
The constant relative differentials scenario (Fr) shows a case where overall TFR 
follows the UN medium scenario (UN 2011), but the relative differentials between 
the religious and educational groups remain (Figure 7). Finally the fertility con-
vergence (Fg) is the case where all fertility differentials by religion and education 
converge by 2060 while overall TFR of India follows the UN medium scenario 
(UN 2013). The assumed convergence of fertility differentials results in a fertility 
rebound as the convergence concerns declining TFRs for low educated, and increas-
ing fertility for highly educated. The effect is illustrated in Figure 8 for Hindus and 
Muslims.
Figure 7.  Total Fertility Rates by education* among Muslims and Hindus according to the constant 
relative differentials scenario (Fr)
Muslims Hindus
* E1 – no education, E2 – Primary education (some primary or completed primary), E3 – Secondary 
education (completed lower or higher secondary), E4 – Postsecondary (above upper secondary).
Source: own elaboration.
To illustrate the effect of education we choose a combination of two simple sce-
narios. In the rapid increase scenario (Er) education rises following the educational 
expansion observed in South Korea in the second half in 20th century – a country 
with the fastest educational expansion ever witnessed. This results in rapid education 
change by 2050. The rapid increase scenario is formulated in accordance to the fast 
track (FR) scenario of the recently published global human capital projections (KC et 
al. 2014). To show the other extreme we present the constant education scenario (Ec) 
15
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Figure 8.  Total Fertility Rates by education* among Muslims and Hindus according to the 
convergence in fertility scenario (Fg)
Muslims Hindus
* E1 – no education, E2 – Primary education (some primary or completed primary), E3 – Secondary 
education (completed lower or higher secondary), E4 – Postsecondary (above upper secondary).
Source: own elaboration.
where educational enrolment does not increase beyond the levels recorded in 2001 
(formulated in terms of constant enrolment rates (CER) scenario in KC et al. (2014). 
Scenarios represent two extreme trajectories and the actual educational improve-
ments in India will fall within this range. The change in educational composition in 
the rapid increase scenario is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9.  Educational composition of the population aged 25 years and above in India, 2000, 2050, in %
Source: own calculations.
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Because we aim to illustrate the effects of educational and fertility change, we 
do not include multiple migration or mortality scenarios. In our projections the net-
migration follows the assumptions of the UN medium scenario (UN 2013). We use 
religious composition of in-migration and out-migration developed in the Pew-ACC 
Religion and Demography Study (Figure 10) (Hackett et al. 2014, Stonawski et al. 
2014). We assume random selection of migrants in terms of education. Outmigration 
rates by age, sex, religion and education are kept constant for the entire projection 
period. In-migration flows by age, sex, religion and education vary in order to meet 
the UN net migration levels.
Figure 10. Religious composition of migrant flows (in %)
Source: own calculations.
Mortality patterns are the same for all religious groups and follow the UN medium 
scenario. Religious switching is marginal in India is not taken into account. Hindu-
ism is one of few religions person can enter only by birth and the share of religiously 
unaffiliated is negligible. This results in fairly stable religious transmission pattern 
and most of the change can be captured by demographic processes. It is possible 
that modernisation and increasing education will bring secularisation in the future 
(Norris and Inglehart 2004), however, research studies on religion in India have not 
found a significant disaffiliation process in India (e.g. Hackett et al. 2015). We also 
do not find any evidence for this in our data. 
The presented four scenarios are combination of the three fertility and two edu-
cation scenarios:
– EcFc is a constant scenario that represents stall in fertility and education. It 
can be understood as a benchmark scenario and provides a point of reference to 
illustrate the effects of education and fertility change.
– EcFr is a persisting inequality scenario. In this possible future inequalities in edu-
cation and fertility persist. Enrolment rates are constant and there is no educational 
expansion but compared to the constant scenario fertility decline continues. Ferti-
17
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lity differentials across the religious and educational groups, however, remain as 
of 2000. 
– ErFc is an educational expansion scenario. Fertility remains constant, i.e. educa-
tional improvements do not translate into change in childbearing. It is presented 
to demonstrate the effect of improving education.
– ErFg is a convergence scenario that represents the most optimistic possible trajec-
tory of rapid educational expansion that translates into behavioural change. Fertility 
declines as education improves and fertility differentials between religious and edu-
cational groups shrink. This development would result in diminishing inequality.
CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE OF INDIA UNTIL 2050 
India had 1.05 billion inhabitants in 2000. In the next 50 years, its population is 
expected to significantly increase to at least 1.7 billion, as shown in Figure 11. In 
case of stalled fertility and no improvements in educational enrolment, India’s popu-
lation would more than double to over 2.3 billion. This trajectory is highly unlikely 
and illustrates that fertility decline or development in education has a very strong 
impact on population size. The results show that increased education makes a great 
difference and the educational expansion scenario (ErFc) illustrates the pure effect 
of rapid educational expansion on population size. Just by increasing the number of 
highly educated women, the Indian population would grow to 1.9 instead of 2.3 bil-
lion even if education-specific TFRs remained the same as in 2000. The combination 
of educational expansion and fertility decline leads to even lower population size 
of 1.7 billion in 2050. 
Figure 11. Overall population size of India according to 4 scenarios, 2000–2050
Source: own calculations.
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The combination of educational expansion and converging fertility differentials 
(convergence scenario, ErFg) results in population size similar to the persisting inequal-
ity scenario (with stalled educational improvements, fertility declining according to the 
UN medium scenario but persisting fertility differentials, EcFr) due to lower overall 
TFR than in the convergence scenario (Figures 7 and 8). However, these two scenarios 
result in very different religious compositions of Indian population by 2050 (Figure 12).
Figure 12.  Projected shares of religious groups in the overall population of India according to 4 
scenarios, 2000–2050
Source: own calculations.
Persisting inequality in fertility outcomes and education (EcFr) would turn India 
into a country less dominated by Hindus. Their share on total population would 
decline from 80.3 in 2001 to 76.9 in 2050. Due to a larger share of less educated and 
higher fertility than Hindus, the share of Muslims would rise from 13.3% in 2001 
to 18.2% in 2050 and the total Muslim population would more than double to 310 
million (Figure 13). The share of other religious groups would decline. 
The total population size would be the same should the convergence scenario 
(ErFg) become the future trajectory of India’s population, but Indians would most 
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likely live in a more equal and prosperous country. India’s economy could take the 
opportunity of the demographic dividend if education increased rapidly and shrink-
ing family size allowed Hindu and Muslim families alike to invest more into the 
human capital of their children. As a result of education reinforcing fertility decline, 
and under the condition of diminishing fertility differentials, the religious landscape 
of India would change the least under this scenario. The share of Muslims would 
increase to a lesser extend to 16.5%, and would still double to 284 million but the 
share of Hindus would decline the least by 2.1 percentage points to 78.2% by 2050. 
The share of Christians would stay about the same (2.6 in 2000 compared to 2.4 in 
2050) and the share of other religions would shrink from 3.7% to 2.9%.
Figure 13.  Projected size of religious groups in India according to 4 scenarios, 2000–2050
Source: own calculations.
The religious composition of India changes the most significantly under the 
constant scenario (EcFc), which results in rapid growth of the Muslim popula-
tion. This scenario illustrates the long-term effect of stalled fertility and education 
enrolment. In this scenario we assume TFRs and fertility differentials remain as of 
2000–2005. If only education was driving the change and fertility stalled (ErFc), the 
resulting religion-specific TFRs would be influenced only by compositional changes 
of the population of women in reproductive age. The educational characteristics of 
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Christian women would be changing at the slowest pace because they were better 
educated than women of other religions. Therefore, their TFR would remain at about 
2.6 children per woman until the end of the projection period. All other religious 
groups would experience fertility decline. Holding fertility rates by education con-
stant, a fast increase in education would depress the fertility of Hindus from 2.83 to 
about replacement level of 2.16 children per woman. Muslims would experience the 
most rapid educational improvements because of their worst education characteris-
tics in 2001 and, consequently, rapid fertility transition. The TFR of Muslim women 
would plummet from 3.76 to 2.5 children per woman. A rapid educational increase 
in combination with convergence of fertility differentials by 2060 would result in 
the narrowest differentials in fertility between the groups (ErFg).
Overall TFR of India would decline to 2.22 children per women without any shift 
in fertility pattern if India were to replicate the educational expansion witnessed by 
South Korea (ErFc). Should fertility differentials persist and education would not 
improve (EcFr) overall Indian TFR would fall more rapidly to 1.85 children per 
woman in 2050 and all religious groups but Muslims would have sub-replacement 
fertility. Fertility decline would be less pronounced under the convergence scenario 
(ErFg) and the overall fertility would stabilize at about 1.96 towards 2050. Muslims 
would still be the most fertile religious group.
Changes in education and fertility would influence population age structure and 
population ageing of the religious groups. Muslims had the youngest population in 
India in 2001 with mean age of nearly 24 years, while Hindus are on average at 27 
years and Christians and others at 28 (Table 3). The constant scenario (EcFc) and 
Table 3. Projected population mean age by scenario, India 2000, 2025, 2050
Scenario Year Christians Muslims Hindu Other Total
ErFc
2000 28.3 23.8 26.7 27.9 26.4
2025 32.7 28.0 31.6 34.1 31.2
2050 35.8 32.9 36.4 40.4 35.9
ErFg
2000 28.3 23.8 26.7 27.9 26.4
2025 33.2 29.1 32.1 34.1 31.8
2050 38.3 35.7 37.9 40.2 37.7
EcFr
2000 28.3 23.8 26.7 27.9 26.4
2025 34.0 28.6 32.3 34.4 31.8
2050 40.6 34.4 38.6 41.7 38.0
EcFc
2000 28.3 23.8 26.7 27.9 26.4
2025 32.2 26.7 30.4 32.7 29.9
2050 34.8 28.5 32.4 35.8 31.8
Source: own calculations. 
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the persisting differentials scenario (EcFr) would lead to an increasing gap between 
the religious groups in term of population ageing. Muslims would be aging at the 
slowest pace and by 2050 their mean age would not exceed 36 years in any presented 
scenario. Educational expansion would speed up population ageing of all religious 
groups. The gap between Muslims and Hindus will be closing rapidly, especially 
under the convergence scenario (ErFg).
SUMMARY
In sum, both education and religion have independent effects on family formation 
and childbearing patterns, and thereby the population growth of India’s religious groups. 
Hence, it is important to take into account both these different dimensions, particularly 
when focusing on a demographically important country such as India. This study has 
demonstrated that a more rapid educational increase and lower fertility is likely to 
a) lead to slower overall population growth as well as a somewhat older population, 
but also b) decrease variation in the growth rate of different religious groups. There is 
likely to be a gradual shift in the religious composition of the Indian population.
Considering religion and education collectively has the potential to significantly 
improve our ability to understand social processes more accurately. Educational 
attainment is added to the religious projections because it can affect fertility and 
other demographic processes. We find large educational differences across reli-
gions in India that are translating into differences in childbearing and the population 
growth of these groups. Increasing educational attainment is among the most impor-
tant drivers of fertility differentials in the contemporary world. Therefore, depending 
on future education gains we can expect a different pace of fertility decline across 
these religious groups that will in turn affect their relative growth and age structure 
– and consequently influence the country’s population growth, its religious composi-
tion and educational differences by religion. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS BY RELIGION
AND EDUCATION IN INDIA 
ABSTRACT
Studying religion jointly with education allows one to produce more precise pro-
jections of the size and structure of religious communities. India’s religious groups 
are characterized by large differences in their education and fertility levels. Among 
those with secondary or more education, there tends to be low variation in fertility, 
while for those without any education, fertility is high and varies substantially. For 
India, if fertility differentials were constant and there was no increase in educational 
enrolment, the Indian population would grow from 846 million in 2000 to more than 
2.3 billion in 2050, while the Hindu population would change from 80.2% to 76.4% 
and the proportion of Muslims would rise from 13.4% to 19%. If fertility converges 
and education levels increases, the population would increase to 1.7 billion by 2050, 
with 78.2% Hindus and 16.5% Muslims. 
Keywords: India, religion, education, multistate population projections
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APPENDIX 2 
STATE ABBREVIATIONS
